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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As IMARKED BY DEcISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
In Palmer v. State, 83 S. V. 202, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas holds that one who -sees his brother
Right to assaulted by another has the same right to resist
Defend the assault, and is entitled to the same defences
Brother or partial defences reducing the grade of crime,
as the person assaulted. Compare Duffee v. State, 8 Texas
App. 187.
In Risdon v. Yates, 78 Pac. 641, the Supreme Court of
California decides that one's plea of guilty on a prosecution
Plea In for assault and battery can be received in a civil
Criminal action therefor only as an admission, and the
Cast justice of the peace before whom the prosecu-
tion is had having testified thereto for plaintiff, as he had
written it down in his docket, defendant may, nevertheless,
cross-examine hiim to prove the entire statement mi ade in
connection therewith, whether written down or not, to show
that it was not an unqualified admission. Compare Root v.
St, ;rdi'ant, 70 Ia. 55.
ASSIGNMENT.
in Helms v. Helms. 49 S. E. I Io, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina holds that where a deed conveys land in
Possibility consideration of the support of the grantor for
ot life by the grantee. and provides that the land
Reverter shall stand good for such support, and if the
grantee fails to support the grantor, the deed shall be void,
the support is not a condition precedent, but a condition sub-
sequent, and the bare possibility of a reverter arising under
such condition is not assignable. Two judges dissent.
Compare Driesbach v. Serf ace, 17 AtI. 513.
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
It is decided in Jones v. Nantahala Marble and Talc. Co.,
49 S. E. (N. C.) 94, that where an attorney wrote a letter to
Prhileged his client as to the litigation, bearing on the
Communica. amount that might be recovered against the
tion client, and which, if known to the opposing side,
might be harmful to the client, a copy of a letter sent by the
attorney to his associate counsel constitutes a privileged com-
munication.
BANKS.
It is held by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Tur-
ner v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, ioi N. W. 348, that under
Liability on a statute of the state providing that a check
Unaccepted drawn on a bank or banker is payable on de-
Check mand, where the drawer of a check had sufficient
funds on deposit subject to check, a bona-fide holder of a
check which has been duly presented and payment refused
may maintain an action against the bank to recover the
amount of the check. One judge dissents. Compare Bloom
v. WVinthrop State Bank, 96 N. V.- 733.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth
Circuit) decides in Shaw v. Nat'l German-American Bank
HoldIngStock Of St. Paid, Mil.. 132 Fed. 658, that a national
of bank has no power to invest its surplus fund in
Other Banks the stock of another national bank, and cannot
be assessed thereon as a stockholder, although it actually
made the purchase and held and received dividends on the
stock. Compare California Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy, 167
U. S. 362.
BONA-FIDE PURCHASER.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota holds in Halloran
v. Holmnes, ioi N. XV. 310. that where one person is the
cashier of a bank and secretar, of another cor-
Payment poration. and is the active manager of both, a
deposit by him in the hank of a consideration for a con-
vevance of land to the corporation of which he is secre-
tary is not equivalent to paynient to the grantor, so as
to protect the grantee, as a bona-fide purchaser, when such
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deposit is retaim d in the bank under the direction of such
person and subjvct to his actual control, and is voluntarily
paid over to the grantor after notice of the invalidity of the
grantor's title.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.
The Court of Appeals of Colorado decides in People's
Building and Loan Ass'n v. Purdy, 78 Pac. 465, that a
Powers mutual building and loan association has no
power to contract that stock will mature in a
definite time.
BURGLARY.
The question as to what is sufficient evidence of the
breaking" required to constitute the crime of burglary is
not always an easy one to answer. A close
case occurs in Claiborne v. State, 83 S. ,V. 362,
where it is held that where one of the windows in the house
which defendant entered in the nighttime had been left up
from the bottom, leaving an aperture which was not large
enough for a man to enter, and defendant increased the
same by raising the window and thereby effectiig an en-
trance, such act constituted a sufficient breaking to sustain
a conviction of burglary. The cases dealing with situations
along the boundary line between what is and what is not
a breaking are collected in this decision. Compare Marshall..
v. State, 94 Ga. 589.
CARRIERS.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Interna-
tional and G. N. R. Co. v. Ilubbs. 82 S. W. 1062, that an
Care Owed instruction that a railroad company owes to its
to passengers the duty to use the highest degree
Passengers of care in transp,,rting them which a person of
the highest degree of care and prudence would use under
like circumstances was obJectitnable as constituting such a
repetition on the (uestion of degree of care required to be
used as was calculated to mislead the jury. Compare Rail-
,'ay Co. v. George. 60 S. WV. 313.
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CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT.
An important decision in reference to the Chinese Exclu-
sion Acts is made by the United States District Court (D.
Involuntary Washington, N. D.) in United States v. Ah
Servitude SoU, 132 Fed. 878. It is there decided that
where a Chincse female was sold as a slave in China, and
her master, with the assistance of other Chinanen, brought
her into the United States for immoral purposes, and after
her escape she was cared for at a church home for Chinese-
women, and it appeared that a decree of deportation would
be equivalent to remanding her to perpetual slavery and
degradation, she was entitled to her discharge under the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, pro-
viding that neither slavery norjinvoluntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
An important decision is made by the United States
Supreme Court in National Exchange Bank of Tiffin, Ohio,
DueProcess v. Solon L. Wiley, 25 S. C. R. 70. It is there
of Law: held that due process of law is wanting in pro-
Full Faith
and Credit ceedings by which judgment is taken in a state
court under a warralit of attorney annexed to a promissory
note, authorizing confession of judgment " in favor of the
holder," if the party in whose favor the judgment was ren-
dered has ceased before the commencement of the suit to own
the note or to be entitled to receive the proceeds to its own
use. since such judgment is, in legal effect, a personal judg-
ment without service or process upon the defendants and
without their appearance in person or by an authorized at-
torney. The court makes the further holding that a judg-
ment taken under a warrant of attorney annexed to a promis-
sorv note, authorizing confession of Judgment " in favor of
the holder," is not protected by the Federal Constitution
and laws, when sued on in another state, from collateral
attack upon the ground that the party in whose behalf it was
rendered was n t in fact the holder, because not the real
owner of the note. See in this connection lVatson v. Paine,
25 Ohio St. 340.
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An extreinely nportant decision is made by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line
Eminent Ry. Co.. 49 S. E. 96, with reference to the rights
Domain of minoritv stockholders in railroads. It is there
held that a law empowering a majority of the stockholders
of certain railways to consolidate with other companies, and
providing for assessing and paying the value of the dis-
senting stock, is an exercise of the power of eminent domain,
and this being so, that a dissenting stockholder cannot rely
on the inhibition of the Federal Constitution, as to the im-
pairment of the obligation of a contract, to defeat a con-
summated consolidation under the act, though her stock
was purchased prior to the Constitution of 1868 taking
effect, reserving to the state the right to amend charters
granted by it, and though her stock was issued by a com-
p'any whose charter was granted when there was no constitu-
tional reservation of power to a man. One judge dissents.
See Black v. Delaware Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 469.
A statute of Kansas passed in 1903, which, became law
after a certain defendant had been convicted of a felony,
Ex Post provided for the " indeterminate sentence," and
Facto Law the defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary
under that act. The law prescribing the punishment for the
offence when it was committed provided for a scale of
credits to be given for good behavior, but the later act of
1903 contained no such provision. It is held in State v.
Tyree, 78 Pac. 525, that such later act is. as applied to crimes
conmmitted before its passage, ex post facto and unconstitu-
tional. See Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221.
CONTRACTS.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
in .. Imcricn .lgricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy & Crawu-
Mutuaity [ord, 48 S. E. 868, that a contract by which
plaintiff agrees to sell fertilizer, and defendants
agree to iy, having no olier consideration than their mu-
tual promise:. and providing that plaintiff may cancel it
at any time, is void for lack of mutuality of engagement, so
tlhat defen(ants may refuse to purchase, though plaintiff
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manufactures the fertilizer and puts it in sacks marked for
them and makes tender thereof. Compare Southern Rail-
way Company v. W ilcox, 98 Va. 222.
DEEDS.
In Miller v. Dunn. 83 S. W. 436, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, Division -No. 2, decides that a deed with ha-
Constru.. bendum clause to the grantee and the heirs of
tion: her body forever, wherein the grantor covenants
Life Estate with the grantee and her bodily heirs to warrant
the title, creates in the grantee a life estate, with remainder
in fee to the heirs of the body of the grantee, though the
granting clause is unlimited to the grantee. Compare Utter
v. Sidman, 170 MO. 284.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.
In Iowa it is provided by a statute similar to statutes in
force in other jurisdictions that" No person who feloniously
Murder of takes or causes or procures another so to take
Ancestor the life of another shall inherit from such person,
or take by devise or legacy from him, any portion of his
estate." The Supreme Court of Iowa, construing the sta-
tute, holds In re Kuhn's Estate, ioi N. W. 151, that it does
not deprive a widow, who was the murderer of her husband,
from her distributive share of his estate, since the widow is
held to take her share not as a matter of inheritance but
as a matter of contract and of right. Compare Phillips v.
Carpenter, 79 Iowa, 6oo, and see also Farmers' and Me-
chanics' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
\ ith three judges dissenting the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas decides in Kansas City Northwestern R. Co. v. Schcwake,
Damages to 78 Pac. 431, that where a railroad company
Abutting appropriates an alley in a city for the purpose
Owner of laying its tracks, and makes a deep excava-
tion therein close ,i the lot line, the damage recoverable
by an abutting owner is restricted to the special injury sus-
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tained by him by reason of access to and egress from his
property being cut off. A landowner does not suffer dam-
ages recoverable at law for injury to lateral support of his
property until the earth is so much disturbed that it slides
or falls. The actionable wrong for impairment to lateral
support is not the excavation, but the act of allowing the
owner's land to fall. Compare Mitchcll v. Darley Main
Collier3, Co., 14 Q. B. D. 125 .
EVIDENCE.
In an action for personal injuries instituted by plaintiff
against a city, the Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that
Real it was not error for the trial court to permit
Evldence the plaintiff, although crippled, to walk to the
witness stand in the presence of the jury: City of Mindcn
v. Vedene, i01 N. W. 330.
The general rule that the actual consideration of a deed
may be shown by parol evidence to be other than that recited
Varying therein is well known.. As an exception thereto
Written it is decided by the Supreme Court of North
instruments Carolina in Dearer v. Dearer, 49 S. E. 113,
that where the payment of the consideration is necessary to
sustain the validity of a deed or contract, the acknowledg-
ment of payment is contractual in its nature and cannot be
contradicted- by parol proof; but where it is to be treated
merely as a receipt for money, it is only prima facie evidence
of the payment, and the fact that there was no payment, or
that the consideration was other than that expressed in the
deed, may be shown by parol. See Kendrick v. Insurance
Co., 124 N. E. 315.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina decides in U. B.
Blalock & Co. v. IV. D. Clark & Bros., 49 S. E. 88, that in
Telegrams an action for non-delivery of cotton, under an
option for sale of which plaintiff had accepted
by telegram, it was competent to prove the telegram by the
testimony of the operator at the sending office, who, though
not the operator who sent it, testified that he brought it
from the file in his office.
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INSANE PERSONS.
The laws of North Carolina (Pub. Laws 1899, page
25, c. i, sec. 65) provides that when any person accused
Imprison, of murder shall be acquitted on the ground
met: of insanity the court shall in its discretion corn-
Due Process
of Law mit him to the hospital for the dangerous insane.
In re Boyett, 48 S. E. 789, the Supreme Court of the state,
considering this provision, holds it unconstitutional as
authorizing restraint without due process of law. The
acquittal on the ground of insanity is regarded as equivalent
to an acquittal on any other ground, and it is therefore only
upon a due inquiry resulting in the finding of insanity that
an order of commitment is permissible. Compare Under-
wood v. The People, 32 Mich. 1.
INSURANCE.
In Gordon v. Ware Nat. Bank of Ware, Mass., 132 Fed.
44-, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth
Ueeral Circuit) applies the rule of S-wift v. Tyson, and
commercial decides that the question whether or not an in-
Law surable interest in an assignee is requisite to the
validity of the assignment of a policy of life insurance, which
was originally issued to one who had an insurable interest,
is a question of general law, upon which the decisions of
the courts of the state in which the assignment was made
are not controlling in the Federal courts.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
-\n important decision in reference to the Anti-pooling
Act of Congress of February 4, 1887, c. 104, occurs in In-
terstate Commerce Connission v. Southern
Pac. Co., 13:2 Fed. 829. The United States
Circuit Court (S. D. California) decides that a rule and
practice adopted and put in force by agreement between
competing railroads and their connecting lines, by which
a through rate on a certain class of traffic is conditioned
on a reservation to the initial carrier of the absolute and
unqualified power to route the shipments beyond its own
line, for the declared purpose of enabling such initial car-
riers to control and maintain the rate so fixed by preventing
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competition, either direct or indirect, between their con-
necting carriers, create in effect a traffic pool within the
meaning of section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Compare United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associa-
tion, 58 Fed.. 93-
LACHES.
The Supreme Court of. California decides in Cahill v.
Superior Court of Cit' and County of San Francisco, 78
Compare Pac. 468, that the defence of laces differs from
with that of limitation in that in order to bar a
Limitation remedy because of laches, there must appear, in
addition to mere lapse of time, some circumstances from
which the defendant or some other-person may be prejudiced,
or there must have been such lapse of time that it may
reasonably be supposed that such prejudice will result if the
remedy is .allowed.
LIBEL
A telegraph company cannot be subjected to punitive
damages because of the transmission and delivery of a
Telegraph libelous message by its agents, where no malice
Companies or wrongful intent is shown on the part of either
the company or its agents other than might be inferred from
the acts themselves: United States Circuit Court of Appeals
(Fifth Circuit) in Vestern Union Tel. Co. v. Cashinan,
132 Fed. 8o 5 . Compare Mileaukce, etc., Ry. Co. v. Arms,
91 U. S. 493.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
. An important holding occurs in Kentucky andI. Bridge
and R. Co. v. Snydor, 82 S. W. 989. where it is decided by
Fellow- the Court of Appeals of Kentucky that the doc-
Servants: trine of non-liability of a master for injury to
Stranger a servant caused by the negligence of a fellow-
servant is based upon the implied contract of the servant
to assume the risk of his fellow-servant's negligence, and
does not extend to a stranger to the relation, who, in con-
jtnction, wvith a servant, injures a fellow-servant of the
latter, but hc i. liable, like any other joint tort feasor.
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It is decided by the St. Louis Court of .Appeals in Dale
v. Hill-O'Meara Coast. Co., 82 S. AV. 1092, that an em-
Fellow- ployee of a subcontractor does not, as against
Servants the* contractor, assume the risk from negligence
of the latter's employee.
MORTGAGES.
In Bray v. Allison. 83 S. AV. 96, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky decides that a mortgage. though using the pro-
Estate nouns **I" and " my." being signed by both
Conveyed husband and wife, included the wife as well as
the husband, though she was not named in the body of the
instrument, and was therefore sufficient to cover the
grantor's homestead interest in the land. See, however,
Davis v. Bartholon,'w. 3 Ind. 485. and a very recent de-
cision in Kentucky. Biverly v. W 'aller, 74 S. W. 264.
MUNICIPAL BONDS.
In Susong v. Cokesbur, Tp., Abbeviilc County, S. C.,
132 Fed. 567. the United States Circuit Court (D. South
Property Carolina) decides that the fact that in trans-
Charged .1th ferring a township into a new county, after it
Payment had issued bonds, a small portion of the terri-
tory was left in the old county, does not prevent that within
the limits of the new c,:mty from being subjected to taxation
for the payment of the bonds. Compare the very recent
decisions of Taylor v. Township of Phie Grove, 132 Fed.
565, and Planters' and Savings Bank v. Huiett Tp., 132
Fed. 627.
MUNICIPALITIES.
In Bryant v. Log-,an. 49 S. E. 21. the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia decides that a lease for the term
Use of Public of tne year. with right to extend it for five
Property years. by a city of a part of a public park. to
improve it. and use it at times for training and running
race-horses, for a rental to the city. reserving access at times
to the public for riding aid driving on the track, is not an
unlawful diversion Of such park from its legitimate use,
and the lease is not v,,id. Compare .\Vcw Orleans v. Louisi-
ana Co., 140 U.. S. 654. It is further held with reference
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to the question as to who might complain if the use had been
unlawful, that citizens and taxpayers, simply as such, stating
no special harm to them different from others, cannot enjoin
the use of a lease of a part of a city park made by the city
for a term of years for the purpose of racing horses.
PLEADING..
In Vcstcrn Travellers' Acc. Ass'n v. Tonison, ioi N. W.
34I, the Supreme Court of Nebraska decides that where the
inconsistent insurer denies that the policy was in force at
Defences the time of the loss, a defence which is based
upon the conditions of the policy, such as that proofs of loss
were not furnished in accordance therewith, is inconsistent
with another defence which asserts that no policy was in
force at the time of the loss. Compare Blodgctt v. Mc-
Murtry, 39 Neb. 210.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
In Daniel v. Atlantic Coast Linc R. Co., 48 S. E. 8M6,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that a cashier
Authorlty of in the local office of a railroad, whose duties are
Local Agent to collect money for freight, and sell tickets to
of Ra lroad passengers, and forward the money to the rail-
road's treasurer, is without authority to cause the arrest of
one whom he suspects of having stolen money from the
office of which the agent is in charge, and the railroad can-
not be held responsible for his wrongful act in making a
false arrest and instigating a malicious prosecution on ac-
count of such theft. Compare Stevens v. Ry. Co., io Exch.
351.
SHERIFFS.
The Supreme Court of Missouri decides in Smoot v.
Judd, 83 S. W. 481, that a sheriff's return of senice of
Palse summons is conclusive except in an action
Return against the sheriff for a false return; and a bill
in equity will not lie to set aside a default judgment based
on the false return, showing proper service, unless plaintiff
in the action was a party to the false return, or knew of it.
and, so knowing, took advantage of it, and was guilty of
fraud in the very act of procuring the judgment.
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STARE DECISIS.
In John T. New v. Territory of Oklahoma, 25 S. C. R.
68, the United States Supreme Court holds that it will not
Appeals consider itself bound on the question of its juris-diction by a prior case in which jurisdiction was
entertained without any suggestion as to the want of it.
Compare in connection with this case United States v. More,
3 Cranch, i59, 172.
TAXATION.
In St. Louis, etc., Railway Company v. Davis, 132 Fed.
629, the United States Circuit Court (E. D. Arkansas, W.
Railroad D.) decides that the action of state authorities
Property in taking the entire valuation of the property
of a railroad company, without as well as within the state,
and dividing it upon a mileage basis for the purpose of
fixing the value of that within the state for purposes of
taxation,. is not in violation of the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution.
TELEPHONE COMPANIES.
In City of Wichita v. Old Colony Trust Co., 132 Fed.
641, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth
Conveyance Circuit) decides that a conveyance by a tele-
of phone company to another company of all its
Property lines, poles, wires, switch-boards, and appurte-
nances in a city carries with it by necessary implication the
franchise from the city under which the system is being
operated. although it is not expressly mentioned.
VACCINATION.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina decides in
Hutchins v. School Committee of Town of Durham, 49 S.
Authorlty of E. 46, that under the charter of a city, giving
SchoolBoard the school board power to prescribe such rules
as might be just and lawful for the management of the
school, the board had authority at a time when an epidemic
of smallpox prevailed to make vaccination a prerequisite to
a scholar's attendance; and it was applicable to a child,
though owing to her physical condition vaccination would
be dangerous; but, it is said. the fact that it would be
dangerous to vaccinate the plaintiff's daughter owing to
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her physical condition would be a defence for her to an
order for general compulsory vaccination, though it is no
reason why she should be excepted from a resolution ex-
cluding from the school all children who have not been
vaccinated. Compare State v. Hay, 126 N. C. 999.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Against the dissent of two judges the Supreme Court of
Michigan'decides in Byrne v. 1Werner, ioi N. W. 555, that
Building cut stone and structural iron belonging to the
Materials an owner of a partially completed building, secured
Premises by him for use in the building, and lying 6n the
lot on which the building stood and on an adjoining one,
passed by the owner's warranty deed of-the lot containing
the building.
WATER COURSES.
The Supreme Court of Kansas decides in Baldtein v.
Ohio Tp., 78 Pac. 424, that the owner of lands through
Riparian which a natural water course flows may accumu-
Owner: late surface waters falling upon lands adjacent
Surfac-Water thereto and cast the same into such stream with-
out becoming liable to a lower riparian owner for damages
so long as the natural capacity of the stream is not exceeded.
Compare Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa. 154.
WILLS.
In Wicker v. Wicker, 49 S. E. IO, it appeared that a tes-
tator devised all his real estate to his wife for life, and
Constru provided, as to the lands devised to his children
ton: in remainder, that if any child died before tes-
Vested Re-
mainder tator or before his wife, his children should
have in remainder, after the death of the wife, the share of
land which the deceased parent of such children would have
taken had the parent survived testator and his wife. Under
these facts the Supreme Court of South Carolina decides that
the will vests in a son at the testator's death a transmissible
interest in remainder, and where the son (lied during the
life of his mother the fee passed to his heirs at law. Com-
pare Boykin v. Boykin, 21 S. E. 513.
